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Transforming transitional justice: lessons from Tunisia’s Internet reform process 
 
Abstract: 
In this article we argue that examining efforts at Internet reform in Tunisia holds important lessons for 
transitional justice theory and practice, as well as for the way the field defines itself in a space where 
technology plays an important role facilitating both repression and transitions. Given the impact of the 
Tunisian revolution in inspiring the Arab uprisings, as well as those elsewhere, a close examination of 
the Tunisian revolution offers many lessons in understanding the transition away from authoritarian 
government: here, we focus specifically on what the Tunisian process of Internet reform can tell us 
about the increasingly-institutionalised implementation of the transitional justice framework. This 
process is particularly notable because it has been informed by transitional justice goals and discourse 
while remaining outside of the formal mechanisms implemented in the wake of the revolution. This 
paper sheds light on the more flexible and responsive ways in which local institutions and activists 
might approach transition, including through attempts to memorialise the impacts of a regime or 
conflict; build trust; incorporate diverse voices in new partnerships; and manage the international 
dimensions of post-conflict reconstruction. Finally, given the central role of the Internet both as a tool 
for repression and as a site of resistance and democratic engagement, our findings indicate the 
importance of future work considering how transitional justice can begin addressing Internet 
governance as a vital aspect of conflict resolution and rebuilding. 
Keywords: Internet governance, transitional justice, Tunisia, censorship, surveillance. 
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Section One:  
Introduction  
As institutional practice around transitional justice develops, there is a growing distance 
between the roots of transitional justice as a process grounded in local conditions, and increasingly 
uniform applications of a ‘toolkit’ based on comparative experiences. This has become an important 
theme both in the academic literature, and for practitioners.3 In light of this, one of the key gaps in the 
literature is work focusing on balancing the need for transferable lessons with encouraging organic 
transitional justice efforts grounded in local experience. As transitional justice is primarily concerned 
with healing and transforming societies that have experienced conflict/repression, it is vital that such 
processes are grounded and localised. 
In this article, we argue that Internet reform in Tunisia, and specifically the experience of the 
Agence Tunisienne d'Internet, Tunisian Internet Agency (ATI), provides us with one such opportunity 
to examine the transitional justice framework. The ousting of Zine El Abidine Ben Ali’s dictatorship in 
Tunisia in January 2011 after a long campaign of civil resistance was the forerunner of the Arab 
Uprisings. The Internet received particular attention in journalistic and academic coverage, with 
numerous sources crediting online organising as key to overthrowing the dictatorship.4 As Tunisia 
rebuilds, a significant part of the process involves unpacking the legacy of Ben Ali’s repressive 
apparatus. The ATI was the Ben Ali regime’s sole Internet service provider and the technical arm of 
the regime’s surveillance and censorship machine. While it is only one part of a complex system of 
                                                          
3  See Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of 
Transitional Justice ,” Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 321–67; Habib Nassar, “Transitional justice  in 
the Wake of the Arab Uprisings: Between Complexity and Standardisation,” in Transitional justice  and the Arab 
Spring, ed. Kirsten J. Fisher and Robert Stewart (Routledge, 2014); Kimberly Theidon, “Editorial Note,” 
International Journal of Transitional justice  3, no. 3 (November 1, 2009): 295–300, doi:10.1093/ijtj/ijp022. 
4  See Mike Elkin, “Exclusive: Tunisia Internet Chief Gives Inside Look at Cyber Uprising,” Wired, 
January 28, 2011, http://www.wired.com/2011/01/as-egypt-tightens-its-internet-grip-tunisia-seeks-to-open-up/; 
Anita Breuer and Jacob Groshek, Online Media and Offline Empowerment in Democratic Transition: Linking 
Forms of Internet Use with Political Attitudes and Behaviors in Post-Rebellion Tunisia, SSRN Scholarly Paper 
(Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, October 1, 2012), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2180788. 
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Internet governance composed of overlapping legal, institutional, and architectural structures,5 it has 
been a key driver of reform and is therefore the focus of this article.  
Although the processes surrounding Internet governance are taking place at a remove from 
transitional justice reforms, the ATI has had to think about the very same issues that characterise 
transitional justice debates, including the extent to which past structures of abuse are revealed and 
discussed; the locus of responsibility for the abuse and the possibilities of punishment; debates 
around transparency and reform; the protection mechanisms against return to rights-violating systems; 
vetting; new uses for contested sites that facilitated abuse by the former regime; and whether space 
should be left for memorialisation. The ATI’s approach to these issues has been informed by, but not 
officially a part of, the transitional justice process, and therefore provides an opportunity to explore 
innovative local approaches to transitional justice. In examining work by the ATI and others in the 
area, we make a vital contribution to rethinking the transitional justice framework both within academia 
and in practice. 
A close examination of the Tunisian revolution and transition has the potential to offer many 
lessons in understanding transitions away from authoritarian government. Here, we focus specifically 
on what the Tunisian process of revising Internet governance can tell us about the increasingly-
institutionalised implementation of the transitional justice framework. This allows us to gain a better 
understanding of how processes of reform and rebuilding can work when informed by the transitional 
justice discourse, but not contained within the theory’s formal mechanisms. This case study is 
particularly important in light of the growing critiques of transitional justice; especially those that argue 
the field as it stands has a limited capacity to innovatively incorporate new challenges, that it largely 
                                                          
5  For more detail, see Alexis Artaud de la Ferrière and Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez. “The Scissors and the 
Magnifying Glass: Internet Governance in the Transitional Tunisian Context.” The Journal of North African 
Studies 19 (5) (2014): 639–55. 
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perpetuates structural inequalities,6 dehumanises victims,7 lacks internal cohesion around its core 
goals,8 and pursues global legal principles that may suffocate local efforts at societal transformation.9  
This work therefore examines Internet governance in Tunisia as an aspect of broader conflict 
transformation efforts, positioning the Internet not just as a communicative tool but also as a symbolic 
site of struggle, which serves as a focus for new discussions around justice, reform, and political 
inclusion; Internet reform overlaps significantly with core transitional justice principles. The ATI’s 
efforts impact society’s ability to communicate openly, and to organise and create networks as active 
citizens outside of formal political frameworks. This perspective brings something new to the literature, 
emphasising how Internet governance in Tunisia is engaging with previously under-developed aspects 
of transition.  
This case study is particularly relevant as a bellwether for the new generation of transitions. In 
Tunisia, the discussion about how change should look is taking place not just in the constitutional 
committees and between political parties, which are highly polarised, but also on the streets, online, in 
the expanding civil society sector, and within institutions that were formerly vehicles of the Ben Ali 
regime. Not all of this, however, is being filtered into the collection of official initiatives looking at the 
                                                          
6  Piers Pigou, “Special Feature: IJTJ Interviews,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 5, no. 
3 (November 1, 2011): 504–18, doi:10.1093/ijtj/ijr024. 
7  Sherene H. Razack, “Stealing the Pain of Others: Reflections on Canadian Humanitarian 
Responses,” Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies 29, no. 4 (July 5, 2007): 375–94, 
doi:10.1080/10714410701454198; Tshepo Madlingozi, “On Transitional Justice Entrepreneurs and the 
Production of Victims,” Journal of Human Rights Practice 2, no. 2 (July 1, 2010): 211, 
doi:10.1093/jhuman/huq005. 
8  Bronwyn Anne Leebaw, “The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional Justice ,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 30, no. 1 (2008): 95–118, doi:10.1353/hrq.2008.0014; Kieran McEvoy, “Beyond Legalism: Towards a 
Thicker Understanding of Transitional justice ,” Journal of Law and Society 34, no. 4 (December 1, 2007): 411–
40, doi:10.1111/j.1467-6478.2007.00399.x; 
9  Hugo van der Merwe, “Transitions in the Middle East and North Africa: new trajectories and 
challenges for transitional justice?”. In Transitional Justice and the Arab Spring, edited by Kirsten J. Fisher and 
Robert Stewart. Routledge, 2014; Godfrey M. Musila, “Options for Transitional Justice in Kenya: Autonomy and 
the Challenge of External Prescriptions,” International Journal of Transitional Justice 3, no. 3 (November 1, 
2009): 445–64, doi:10.1093/ijtj/ijp018; Jaya Ramji-Nogales, “Designing Bespoke Transitional justice : A Pluralist 
Process Approach,” Michigan Journal of International Law 32 (2011 2010): 1; Eric Stover, Hanny Megally, and 
Hania Mufti, “Bremer’s ‘Gordian Knot’: Transitional justice  and the US Occupation of Iraq,” Human Rights 
Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2005): 830–57, doi:10.1353/hrq.2005.0044. 
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legacy of violence of previous regimes that are gathering momentum under the rubric of transitional 
justice, but whose grassroots legitimacy is also being challenged.10 
While we do not argue that Internet governance should be central to transitional justice 
efforts, there are grounds for considering the ways Internet reform and transitional justice processes 
overlap, and might mutually inform each other. In this article we argue that examining one 
organisation’s efforts at Internet reform in Tunisia holds important lessons for transitional justice theory 
and practice, as well as for the way the field defines itself in a space where technology plays an 
important role facilitating both repression and transitions.  
Methodology 
This article seeks to understand what the Tunisian process of revising Internet 
governance can tell us about the increasingly institutionalised implementation of the transitional justice 
framework. While the work is using the case of Tunisia to re-think transitional justice as a theoretical 
and empirical framework, it is not testing a hypothesis, but rather exploring a question. It therefore 
situates itself within the pragmatic social sciences approach, using mixed methods to arrive at its 
conclusion. The primary framework was inductive and the purpose of the research exploratory; that is, 
we were using the case study to reflect back on both the existing theory and practice of transitional 
justice. A strong feature of this approach is a grounded methodology led by the concerns of 
practitioners working in the field, rather than by theoretical imperatives.This article draws together a 
deep engagement with the field of transitional justice, including both the academic literature and the 
practice associated with organisations such as the International Center for Transitional Justice 
(ICTJ),11 with qualitative critical discourse analysis, and qualitative, semi-structured interviews carried 
out in Tunisia.  
                                                          
10  See for example Olfa Belhassine, ‘Tunisia Transitional Justice Unit Focuses on Victims’, allAfrica, 
July 27, 2015  http://allafrica.com/stories/201507281275.html 
11  Yakinthou was the country manager of ICTJ’s Cyprus office, and has also managed components 
of ICTJ’s Lebanon programming as well as consulting on other transitional justice programming both for ICTJ 
and other initiatives. 
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By grounding this reflection on transitional justice as an academic theory and as a body of 
practice in the experience of Tunisians negotiating the transformation of Internet governance, the 
paper allows a better understanding of how transitional justice can meet the challenges it faces, and 
which have been outlined above. This case study was chosen because Tunisia has frequently been 
cited as best practice for current transitional justice work.12 It is a process that has had five years to 
mature, giving some opportunity for transitional justice mechanisms to take shape. At the time 
research was undertaken, Tunisia was the only case in the early enough stages for us to understand 
how perceptions of transitional justice and its importance to reform are developing in civil society and 
government structures during an active transition, and how an administrative body which has reformed 
understands itself in relation to transitional justice processes.  
 Over two weeks in March and April 2013, a crucial period in which the transitional justice 
process was still very much under way, fifteen in-depth, semi-structured interviews were carried out 
with activists and policymakers in Tunisia. These interviews were targeted at building a complex 
picture of different perspectives on the transitional justice process, and on Internet governance in the 
post-revolution period. Interviewees included people who took part in implementing censorship and 
surveillance under the Ben Ali regime, Internet freedoms activists, members of transitional justice-
specific Tunisian and international non-governmental organisations, and policymakers within the 
current Tunisian government. This range of participants allowed us to understand the transitional 
justice process both from within, and from the perspective of outsiders who were more involved in 
reconstructing Internet governance, and who did not see their work as part of the transitional justice 
process. A purposive sampling strategy was used for those involved in the transitional justice process, 
and the first author’s access to the transitional justice community was used to draw up an initial 
interviewee lists. Some informants, however, were part of hidden populations and so we also made 
                                                          
12  Luca Urech, “Challenging History: The Power of Transitional Justice in Tunisia”, Al Nakhlah, June 
10, 2014; David Tolbert, “ ‘Tunisian Spring’ Continues, But Challenges Remain”, The World Post, August 8, 
2015; Ali Anouzla, “Tunisia’s Transition”, Al Arabya, November 6, 2014. 
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use of snowball sampling methods. Two sets of interview guides were developed, one for transitional 
justice-related actors and another for Internet governance and social media activists. In each case, 
some questions were adapted to the expertise of the informant. Particular key questions about the 
transitional justice process, how interviewees came to know about transitional justice, and its relation 
to Internet governance remained through every interview, as a means of seeking consistent themes. 
 All interviewees were offered the option of anonymous participation, and in these cases 
further attempts have been made to ensure that participants are not identifiable through details of their 
employment or lives. While this is vital to ethical research, some participants, particularly activists, 
have compelling reasons to prefer being identified by name, or by a well-known pseudonym. If we are 
to take seriously the injunctions to treat activists as experts in their own right, and co-producers of 
knowledge,13 we also must acknowledge that at times activists will value the visibility and 
acknowledgement of their work that comes with real-name or pseudonymous participation. Activists’ 
decisions to seek visibility for their work is also, at times, informed by the potential protection afforded 
by international attention, as was seen in the case of efforts to free Egyptian blogger Alaa Abdel 
Fatah.14 A commitment to ethical research processes and respect for participants’ knowledge and 
autonomy must also include leaving room for participants’ informed decisions to balance potential 
harms and benefits of anonymity.15  
 This research has obvious limitations. First, it is a single case study with an individual 
organisation as the primary unity of analysis. Ideally the findings of this research would be tested 
against other case studies in a larger comparative study, across longer time periods. Second, we 
                                                          
13  Graeme Chesters and Ian Welsh, “Complexity and Social Movement(s),” Theory, Culture & 
Society 22, no. 5 (2005): 145. 
14  Mostafa Mohie and Manal Hassan, “Get the Facts: The Case of Jailed Egyptian Activist Alaa Abd 
El Fattah,” Global Voices Advocacy, June 13, 2014, http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2014/06/13/get-the-
facts-the-case-of-jailed-egyptian-activist-alaa-abd-el-fattah/; Jillian C. York, “Good News: Alaa Abd El Fattah 
Freed On Bail,” Electronic Frontier Foundation, September 15, 2014, 
https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/09/good-news-alaa-abd-el-fattah-freed-bail. 
15  Research was carried out in line with the Helsinki Declaration of 1975 (2000), and was approved 
by the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee, ID: 4427, 19 March 2013. 
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acknowledge that as an exploratory work that expands the discussion of transitional justice to a new 
area, we have limited space for deep theoretical reflection. We focus, rather, on drawing together 
empirical material to highlight innovations to the transitional justice framework that would benefit from 
more comprehensive elaboration in future publications. 
Outline  
Section Two sets out our case study, outlining the transitional justice framework in Tunisia 
and information controls (including Internet censorship and surveillance) in Tunisia under Ben Ali. This 
section highlights the ways in which the legacy of information controls (and therefore also Internet 
reform processes) overlap with broader transitional justice concerns, in Tunisia and elsewhere. 
Section Three holds a deeper analysis of our findings, including the ways activists and institutional 
actors in Tunisia have addressed national and international legacies of information controls and 
attempted to build new structures for Internet reform. Finally, the conclusion focuses on how these 
findings might translate into broader contributions to the discussion of three key criticisms of the 
transitional justice framework. Firstly, that it is inflexible and does not respond effectively to new 
experiences and needs; secondly, that more attention must be paid to structural inequalities between 
transitional justice practitioners/experts and local communities; and thirdly, that it fails to address 
international complicity in human rights abuses. 
 
Section Two 
Through the Looking Glass: Internet Governance and the Transitional Justice Framework 
Transitional justice is a field that has emerged over the last roughly three decades of human 
rights practice. Over the first decade of its development, there was no uniform approach to addressing 
10 
legacies of state-sanctioned violence.16 However, the last period has seen a move towards the 
standardisation of approaches across contexts, particularly as it becomes part of the international 
community’s post-conflict agenda. The establishment of transitional justice institutions like the ICTJ in 
2001 (and others subsequently), the publication of the UN Secretary-General’s key 2004 report on 
transitional justice (‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies’), 
and the 2012 establishment of a UN Special Rapporteurship on the promotion of truth, justice, 
reparation and guarantees of non-recurrence have played a significant role in its entrenchment as an 
area of both practice and study. The latter two have formally brought the field into the UN system.  
Transitional justice can be defined as a series of judicial and non-judicial efforts to overcome 
legacies of significant human rights abuses. Though it is rooted in principles including the rights to 
truth, justice, and non-repetition, at its most conservative it is articulated, especially by the ICTJ and 
the UN, as a collection of ”mechanisms” to address these legacies. These centre on criminal 
prosecutions, truth commissions, reparations programmes, and institutional reforms.17 While there are 
a number of interpretations of transitional justice that challenge this framing,18 they will be discussed in 
Section Three. We use this particular understanding here because it is these actors that are setting 
agendas and guiding transitional justice programming in Tunisia. 
Internet governance is not considered part of the transitional justice framework. Academic 
and policy analysis of transitional justice barely even mentions the Internet, and certainly does not 
provide in-depth examination of the place of Internet governance within the transitional justice 
                                                          
16  Paige Arthur, “How ‘Transitions’ Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
Justice,”. 
17  See ICTJ ‘What is Transitional Justice’, https://www.ictj.org/about/transitional-justice; ‘The Rule of 
Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies: Report of the Secretary-General’, United 
Nations Security Council Document S/2004/616 section III-8. 
18  For a summary, see Hugo van der Merwe’s concluding chapter in a recent work on transitional 
justice in MENA. Hugo van der Merwe, ‘Transitions in the Middle East and North Africa: new trajectories and 
challenges for transitional justice?’. 
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framework. This is not surprising, given that the framework’s development preceded the widespread 
use of the Internet.  
However, the literature and practice of transitional justice does touch on key issues 
related to Internet governance. For example, the transitional justice literature addresses the need to 
allow avenues for citizens to make their concerns heard and question authority;19 to balance lustration 
law with the right to political expression;20 and more generally to build a robust democracy and an 
engaged citizenry, which is assumed to include a healthy media environment as a ‘fourth pillar’ of 
democracy.21 While some authors and practitioners are addressing the role of the Internet in 
democratic reconstruction,22 this is not happening within the transitional justice framework. 
The Tunisian Transitional Justice Landscape and Emerging Critiques 
Although the Tunisian transition has been the face of the new generation of transitional 
justice and of the MENA revolutions, it has also been challenged by a variety of push and pull factors 
for and against reform. While the country is moving towards the implementation of a new constitution it 
also, in November 2014, elected a president with strong links to the old regime.23 This may change the 
landscape of the transition and has implications for transitional justice efforts.24 At the same time, two 
2015 terrorist attacks purportedly by Daesh-affiliates have negatively impacted laws around a number 
                                                          
19  Aneta Wierzynski, “Consolidating Democracy through Transitional justice : Rwanda’s Gacaca 
Courts,” New York University Law Review 79 (2004): 1934. 
20  Roman David, “Transitional Injustice? Criteria for Conformity of Lustration to the Right to Political 
Expression,” Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 6 (2004): 789–812. 
21  Rupert Skilbeck, “Building the Fourth Pillar: Defence Rights at the Special Court for Sierra Leone,” 
Essex Human Rights Review 1, no. 1 (2004): 66–86. 
22  Anita Breuer and Jacob Groshek, Online Media and Offline Empowerment in Democratic 
Transition: Linking Forms of Internet Use with Political Attitudes and Behaviors in Post-Rebellion Tunisia, SSRN 
Scholarly Paper (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, October 1, 2012). 
23  ‘Essebsi wins Tunisia presidential vote’, Al Jazeera, 23 December 2014. 
24  In the October 2014 parliamentary elections, the secularist party Nidaa Tounes won the majority 
of seats. The party’s head, veteran politician Beji Caid Essebsi, won the subsequent presidential elections. 
There are considerable implications for the transitional justice  landscape in Tunisia, as Caid Essebsi was prime 
minister under Habib Bourguiba, Ben Ali’s predecessor. This has most clear implications for the Truth and 
Dignity Commission (discussed in this paper), as the TDC’s mandate includes human rights violations committed 
under the Bourguiba period, and Caid Essebsi has already made comments about repealing aspects of the 
transitional justice law. For indicative political analysis, see Rim El-Gantri, “Transitional Justice in Tunisia: The 
Implications of Political Change”, Insight on Conflict, 5 May 2015. 
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of civil rights for citizens.25 There is a perception that the government is quietly undermining freedom 
of expression laws, and that there is a return of censorship and surveillance through agencies that 
have no independent oversight. There are also concerns about the lack of real reform in the security 
sector and judiciary, and ongoing police violence.26  
While all this happens, a wide variety of actors previously excluded from political 
processes are also starting to be involved in them, as well as in reform efforts. In this tense climate, 
the revolution’s vanguard, and its watchdog, has been and continues to be civil society and Internet 
activists, including critical voices linked to independent media online. This makes the nexus between 
Internet reform, via the work of the ATI, and transitional justice mechanisms, important to watch. 
Where mainstream media is largely silent and owned by a shrinking group of key political actors, 
bloggers have continuously forced issues into public consciousness (see, for example, Smadhi’s27 
coverage of the court case against blogger Yassine Ayari on Tunisia Live and Guerfali’s28 coverage of 
protections for free speech online in the Tunisian Constitution on Nawaat). It is fitting, then, that the 
one area that underwent constant and steady reform to general widespread satisfaction in the early 
days after the fall of Ben Ali was Internet governance.  
The ATI’s approach to reform has been inclusive, creative, and almost entirely off the 
radar of the transitional justice process. Its experiences hold relevant lessons, particularly in the 
broader context of a visible tension in both the literature and practice between the need for transition 
                                                          
25  Eileen Byrne, “Tunisia’s President Declares State of Emergency Following Terrorist Attack”, The 
Guardian, July 4 2015; Vanessa Szakal, “Counterterrorism Law: looking beyond laxity vs. despotism, security vs. 
human rights”, Nawaat, April 12 2015. 
26  Hanen Keskes and Robert Joyce, “Tunisian Police Accused of Torture,” Al Jazeera English, 
November 10, 2013; Reuters and Bouazza Ben Bouazza, “Police Brutality Claims Shadow Tunisia Elections,” 
News 24 Tunisia, October 22, 2014; “HRW Demands ‘Credible’ Probe on Tunisia Detainee Death”, Al Arabiya, 
19 May 2015. 
27  Asma Smadhi, “Yassine Ayari Plans to Return to Tunisia to Challenge Prison Sentence,” Tunisia 
Live, January 30, 2014. 
28  Riadh Guerfali, “La Tunisie, 1er Pays À Constitutionnaliser La Protection de L’usage de l’Internet,” 
Nawaat, December 25, 2013. 
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processes to learn from within—that is, from local experiences—and the need for best practice 
learning from other contexts. 
 On the other hand, transitional justice in Tunisia seems to have followed a more 
conventional path. Ghali29 has argued that there have been two primary phases of transitional justice 
in Tunisia that correspond to the periods between the revolution and the election (January to October 
2011) and between the post-revolution election until the adoption of the constitution in January 2014.30 
We would add that a third phase began with the adoption of the Transitional Justice Law,31 and the 
launch of the Truth and Dignity Commission (TDC) in June 2014.32 The first phase focused on the 
establishment of investigative commissions looking at corruption, embezzlement and human rights 
violations,33 as well as early conferences introducing transitional justice, held by Tunisian centres for 
democracy. This shaped early conceptions of transitional justice in Tunisia. Included in the second 
phase are events such as the establishment of the landmark Ministry of Human Rights and 
Transitional Justice and the expansion between 2011 and 2012 of civil society organisations with a 
transitional justice focus and a base in capacity building, and a very broad spectrum of rights agendas. 
With the involvement of key international transitional justice actors (particularly the ICTJ and UNDP), a 
technical commission was also formed to manage the national debate on TJ, producing the draft 
transitional justice law.  
 While this second phase demonstrated a remarkable capacity and willingness of local 
                                                          
29  Amine Ghali, “The Evolution of Transitional Justice in Tunisia, from the Revolution to Today,” in 
Rule of Law and Transitional justice : Towards a Triangular Learning (European Inter-University Centre for 
Human Rights and Democratisation conference publication, 2013). 
30  English translation of document by UNDP available at 
https://www.constituteproject.org/constitution/Tunisia_2014.pdf 
31  Draft Organic Law on the Organization of Transitional Justice Foundations and Area of 
Competence, adopted by the National Constituent Assembly on 15 December 2013. Arabic, French, and English 
versions available at: http://www.constitutionnet.org/vl/item/tunisia-draft-organic-law-foundations-and-
organization-transitional-justice. 
32  On the TDC and its progress, see Carlotta Gall, “Torture Claims in Tunisia Await Truth 
Commission”, The New York Times, 19 May 2015. 
33  These commissions were announced by Ben Ali in the last days of his presidency in an effort to 
quell public anger, but were formalised and implemented by the transitional government. 
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institutions to begin working on transitional justice processes, it also highlighted some of the issues 
surrounding the framework, including the overwhelming pressure to develop transitional justice 
institutions quickly at the expense of building deep and broad public platforms for discussion, which 
takes time; the exclusion of certain voices; and the need to provide space for people to shape their 
own visions of transitional justice, instead of boxing public voices into pre-existing strategies. On the 
other hand, this process was useful in building a common language and framework around which 
visions of the future can be modelled. This also affects the context within which sideline reform efforts 
like the ATI’s have been shaped: from our primary data, it appears that interplay exists between the 
articulation of reform in Tunisia as laid out so comprehensively by the transitional justice landscape, 
and efforts with aligned goals that are outside the official transitional justice framework.  
 Our interviewees’ critiques of the Ministry and dominant approaches to transitional justice 
in Tunisia speak to broader concerns around the balance between the creation of an organic process 
which is at least in part responsive to specific citizens’ needs, and implementation of core transitional 
justice mechanisms that address global principles of reform and the attainment of justice. This tension 
is best articulated by an anonymous interviewee working in the field:  
If you see any debate on transitional justice it’s […] very much focused on procedure. How 
do you proceed, rather than what kind of place you want to live in, which is the essential 
question. What is our vision for the future of this country? How do we see ourselves 20 
years from now? This is transitional justice. It’s not about, you know, what sort of 
procedures should be placed, what sort of laws should be placed. It’s part of the process 
of course to have laws about this, but it’s not the main process. 
Speaking to broader criticisms concerning consequences of transporting the ‘transitional justice 
industry’ to Tunisia, an anonymous interviewee working for an international organisation commented 
that:  
15 
The community that is involved in this [Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional Justice] 
is a very closed community. It’s really not open to many people, and it’s also a technical 
community. So they come with all these really established ideas for what counts as TJ, 
what counts as reparation. And what they do is they go and talk to people in the regions, 
then they translate or try to translate what these people say into their own legalistic 
language of reparation, of non-repetition, etc. But I would much rather have the opposite 
happen, which is basically that people talk [and we get to what people want from there]. 
This model of transitional justice feeds into broader concerns with the increasing inflexibility of both the 
theory and the field, captured by Nassar’s recent critique that the transitional justice priority 
(particularly in MENA) has been flipped towards a consolidation of the normative framework of 
transitional justice at the expense of the actual needs of the society in question: that ‘[s]tandardizing 
policies and mechanisms generates a rigidity that precludes transitional justice from fully addressing 
the regional and national complexities’.34 Five years in, warning signs are clear: our interviewee noted 
the specific impact of this standardised framework on the development of transitional justice in 
Tunisia: 
What I see happening is you have this top-down framework that is taking much space, 
public space, but there are small processes on the side, which are not recognised as 
transitional justice processes, because they don’t fit into this global framework. So you 
have, I hear it in the regions I visit, very nice debates on, for example on ending 
discrimination against certain groups. I mean these debates would fit under transitional 
justice but they’re not part of this national discussion because they’re happening locally, 
because these people don’t have access to this machinery of transitional justice that the 
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government has set up. 
We argue that the introspection, reform, and re-framing of the ATI as a defender of civil liberties may 
well be one of those ‘small processes on the side’ that carry significant local innovation. Examination 
of this particular sideline process illuminates the importance of an area that is of increasing relevance 
to the issues around reconciliation and rebuilding trust, which are central transitional justice concerns. 
It also offers broader lessons about how the increasingly-formalised transitional justice process might 
be rethought to better meet local needs. 
Internet Governance in Tunisia 
 In contrast with the recognised transitional justice processes, here we use the informal 
process surrounding Internet reform in Tunisia—focusing on the ATI’s role—to underline some of the 
criticisms and weaknesses outlined in the literature. While Internet governance may not be considered 
part of the transitional justice framework, in this case it both echoes and grapples with many of the 
field’s concerns. To understand this, it is useful to briefly review the country’s history of Internet 
censorship and surveillance, which we refer to collectively as “information controls” to capture their 
complexity and reach. There were a number of important characteristics of this regime. These include 
the central role of the ATI within Internet governance; the purchase of European censorship and 
surveillance technology; and the ways censorship and surveillance overlapped with other mechanisms 
of state control and, subsequently, with the lived experience of Tunisians under the dictatorship. 
 The history of Internet regulation in Tunisia mirrors the increasing importance of 
controlling online spaces for many governments (authoritarian or otherwise). Wagner35 argues that 
there have been four stages in the Tunisian government's approach to the Internet, shifting from a 
complete lack of regulation in its early days through to censorship, surveillance, and then active 
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attacks on targeted sites and accounts. While the extent of controls implemented by the Tunisian 
government are more extreme than in many other states, they are part of a continuum that includes 
democratic states. This is particularly evidenced by the provision of censorship and surveillance 
technology to Tunisia from European and US companies. Information controls were not only an issue 
during Tunisia’s dictatorship, but are an ongoing area of contestation during transition and peace-
building around the world.  
 Under Ben Ali, the ATI was not entirely responsible for information controls: some of this 
responsibility seems to have lain directly in Ben Ali's hands. While Kamel Saadaoui, director of the ATI 
for three years, emphasised that the ultimate power lay with the government, he also acknowledged 
the ATI's role in hosting and maintaining censorship and surveillance technology, and the widespread 
public perception of the ATI as a vital part of the Tunisian government's Internet control framework.36 
Similarly, Moez Chakchouk, head of the ATI after Saadaoui, leading much of the reform process within 
the institution, said in an interview that the ATI maintained the equipment, but that the Ministry of the 
Interior accessed and controlled it. At the same time, he recognised that the ATI’s previous 
administration was implicated in these processes, and that there was a need to rebuild trust. Wagner's 
work makes it clear that although the Ministry of the Interior did develop blacklists, manually filter 
emails, and engage in other decisions around censorship and surveillance, the ATI was integral to this 
process, including through its development of in-house products for email filtering.37 Crucially, while 
many decisions about censorship and surveillance were carried out by ‘a special unit within the interior 
ministry [...] the ATI was still branded as Ammar404 [the nickname given to the censorship 
mechanisms by Tunisian Internet users] in public.’38 This means that separate to the extent of its 
responsibilities, which remain unclear, the ATI came to be seen as an important institution (albeit not 
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Decade,” 487. 
38  Ibid., 489. 
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the only one) responsible for the implementation of the dictatorship and, thus, implicated in the 
process of post-conflict change.  
 The ATI has also engaged with questions around international complicity in human rights 
abuses. Although some aspects of the information control regime after 1997 were developed and 
administered within Tunisia, imported technology played a vital role in online censorship. In the wake 
of the Tunisian revolution, Saadaoui spoke in detail about how Internet control technologies were 
acquired, listing companies from the US, UK, Germany, and other European countries as providing 
support.39 Chakchouk said in 2013 that as the ATI was still in the process of sorting through and 
finalising contracts for this equipment, including completing final payments to international companies; 
he followed Saadaoui in respecting non-disclosure agreements where they were in place. However, 
he publicly name the companies with which there were no non-disclosure agreements at the 2011 
Arab Bloggers’ Meeting. The role of international companies in facilitating Tunisian information 
controls, and the costs and difficulty of dismantling its legacy, should make it clear that Internet 
governance is an ongoing issue which—like so many aspects of transitional justice—extends beyond 
Tunisia's borders, has complicated questions around international responsibility and complicity, and 
has a longer temporal framework than may immediately be recognised. In this respect, while the ATI’s 
efforts to grapple with international complicity in the regime’s information controls do not offer a 
complete solution, they do point to some areas that need to be addressed. 
  
 It is important to connect this to the lived experiences of activists and others targeted by 
censorship and surveillance. Attacks on email were one of the most notable examples of this, and 
after 2003 ‘interior ministry operators went through emails, sometimes dropped or modified the 
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contents and then forwarded emails, often hours later to their intended recipients.’40 This aspect of the 
regime also impacted people who weren't involved in politics but whose email included content critical 
of the government, as Silver's investigative work in 2011 showed.41 The ability of the surveillance 
apparatus to modify, as well as read and censor emails, had particularly chilling effects. While on 
occasion email content would be replaced by garbled symbols or advertising, at times it also included 
messages such as, ‘you can run but you can’t hide,’ pornographic material, or inappropriate sexual or 
threatening content to recipients.  
 The moment of jubilation that accompanied the end of Ben Ali's information control 
regime has been followed by the recognition that significant work is still required to deal with its after-
effects, and to build an alternative system of Internet governance (not to mention restricting 
surveillance of mobile and other communications). As well as dealing with the distrust created by 
years of information controls, the ATI remains in possession of many of the machines used by the 
regime, and has borne the financial costs of the final periods of contracts with providers of censorship 
and surveillance technology, as Chakchouk noted. A series of highly visible cases relating to freedom 
of expression online have arisen, with some worrying outcomes,42 although in other cases Net 
freedoms activists have been more pleased with results.43 Even committed Net freedoms activists with 
whom we spoke often saw the need for some form of regulation of online content, and Chakchouk 
talked about the need for a clearer delineation of the ATI's role as the provider of a technical service. 
Recent research44 demonstrates that while blanket censorship has ended in Tunisia, technical 
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mechanisms that would allow mass surveillance remain in place. These concerns, as well as many 
others, require ongoing negotiation and dialogue about what the Internet will look like in post-
revolutionary Tunisia, and the ATI has been at the forefront of these discussions. 
 These issues play a significant role beyond the limited sphere of Internet governance. 
Internet regulation in post-revolution Tunisia will undeniably shape a wide range of personal freedoms, 
and the democratic potential of the political system: the Internet has become a key platform for citizen 
engagement.  
Separate universes or concentric circles? Transitional justice and Internet 
governance as they currently stand  
 In Tunisia, both the gap between transitional justice and Internet reform/governance and 
a recognition of areas of overlap were reflected in interviews. One Internet activist, Phoewass, when 
asked whether changes to the ATI’s functioning after the revolution were part of the transitional justice 
process replied emphatically not, in part because of the success of Internet reform, in contrast to the 
perceived failure of the transitional justice process. NGOs, similarly, did not often see these issues as 
connected; Hisham Sharif from the Tunisian Centre for Transitional Justice replied to the same 
question that, ‘no, it is not transitional justice, it is Internet reform.’ At the government level, Internet 
reform is also not being addressed. In an interview with Mohsen Sahbani, Advisor to the Tunisian 
Minister of Transitional Justice and Human Rights, he noted that there was little if any coordination 
with or awareness of the work of the ATI. However, key staff involved in the ATI’s work, both during 
and post-dictatorship, firmly placed Internet governance within the remit of transitional justice: ‘Internet 
reform is part of transitional justice…it is the life of a person. Everywhere. It is in your phone, your 
home, your job. I have to work …to get the real solution without touching the freedom of the other 
person.’ 
This recognition of the ATI's reform work as related to the broader transitional justice 
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process demonstrates the reach of the transitional justice narrative and its potential impact beyond 
formal mechanisms, but the ATI has few links with either government or international institutions 
implementing the framework. It is unclear whether incorporating Internet reform within formal 
transitional justice mechanisms in Tunisia would have helped or hindered the process: while this may 
have provided additional resources and political attention to the urgency of Internet reform, it may also 
have diminished the ability of the ATI and other actors to develop flexible and responsive processes. 
Additionally, it makes it clear that activists’ and other practitioners’ understandings of different issues’ 
relationship to transitional justice (in this case, Internet governance) is shaped in part by how effective 
and participatory transitional justice processes are seen to be. It would therefore be useful to build on 
this research by exploring the contestation through which different areas are included or excluded 
from local understandings of transitional justice. In the following section, we explore some of the 
arguments for considering Internet governance within the aegis of transitional justice reforms. 
 
Section Three  
Transforming Transitional Justice: Learning Lessons from Tunisia 
“If It Looks Like a Duck…”-  The ATI’s Reform Processes 
 While the harms caused by Internet surveillance and censorship were, as many of our 
interviewees noted, far less serious than the systematic imprisonment, torture, exile, and other forms 
of oppression faced by many under the Ben Ali government, they nevertheless played an important 
role in sustaining the dictatorship and in the day-to-day repression experienced under the regime, as 
highlighted above. Some bloggers and online journalists were jailed and tortured; this leaves the ATI 
(and Internet governance mechanisms more generally) with a legacy closer to transitional justice 
concerns than has to-date been acknowledged. Tunisian blogger Zouhair Yahyaoui was arrested in 
2000 for ‘inviting readers to vote on whether Tunisia was “a republic, a kingdom, a zoo or a prison”.’ 
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He died in 2005 of a heart attack after being extensively tortured in prison.45 In 2009, bloggers’ 
advocacy site Global Voices placed Tunisia after Iran as ‘one of the most repressive countries towards 
bloggers and online activists’. Blogger Fatma Riahi46 and journalists Zuhair Makhlouf and Taoufik Ben 
Brik were also arrested after criticising the government. The introduction of a new framework for 
Internet governance is therefore vital to the reconstruction process. 
 Just as the opening-up of the Internet underpins many of the transitional justice 
processes being put in place, particularly around freedom of expression, there is also a sense of 
Internet governance as one of the few areas where transition is happening effectively. One 
Internet activist, Slim Amamou, said of the shift, ‘it [the ATI] was the enemy, the censor guys, 
and they made a point in fighting against censorship. I mean, they fought against the decision in 
court for censoring pornography’. 
Another, Phoewass, said, ‘Actually, the only thing that's gone into transition is the ATI. Moez 
Chakchouk and his team represent the only institution that is really committed to making a democratic 
transition.’ Another activist, who also has experience with international institutions working in Tunisia, 
Douha Ben Youssef, said, ‘The only transitional justice case that succeeded is the case of the ATI. 
When you see Fatma Riahi (Arabicca) who was in jail […] going to the ATI, discussing and laughing 
with all the team, making interviews, and saying thank you on Twitter to the ATI, to Moez, to all the 
team, it's the only thing that … it's the only case that succeeded.’ 
 The ATI has been a key actor driving broader processes of Internet reform, and has 
grappled with issues around vetting and employment of regime staff, internal reform and transparency, 
and restitution. Since its reform, the ATI has created opportunities for dialogue both within its walls 
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and with activist and Internet governance communities about its role during the dictatorship, including 
through the establishment of the 404 Lab at the site of the former centre for Internet censorship.47 The 
nature of the violations committed by the ATI means that vetting and prosecution procedures have 
been easier for the agency to sidestep: very few people were imprisoned, tortured, or killed as a result 
of the ATI’s machinery, and the ATI is able to say that, as a technical body, it did none of this directly 
itself. At the same time, it was the surveillance arm of a deeply repressive state, and it has chosen to 
confront this legacy directly. 
 In addition, the ATI has consciously made what can be framed in transitional justice terms 
as a global restitution initiative, becoming the first country in Africa to install TOR servers. These 
servers will allow people in countries that use Internet censorship to use Tunisian servers to ‘freely 
access the internet’; the initiative was firmly positioned as legacy project.48 The ATI has been involved 
in leading conferences on Internet freedom, and developing relationships with the US-based 
Electronic Frontiers Foundation and other international Net freedoms groups.49 Tunisia has also joined 
the Freedom Online Coalition, a network of 23 governments committed to protecting freedom of 
expression, association, assembly and privacy online. Often these discussions have included frank 
declarations of how the ATI worked under the regime, the companies that provided surveillance 
equipment to the agency, and the challenges it faces today including around pressure to continue 
censorship and surveillance.  
 The management's perspective on vetting and institutional reform processes, and its pre-
and post-revolution role has also been interesting. When asked about vetting, reform, and 
accountability, Chakchouk replied that his board’s approach was to balance the need to retain skilled 
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staff (some have left) with ensuring deep intra-institution understanding and buy-in about the 
importance of civil liberties and especially open Internet: 
We don't need to go to a court and put them in jails. After all, okay, they made it for a 
reason, Ben Ali's pressures. We really tried with the board to regularise, or to make things 
clear, without putting people in a position to face a court, or lawyers, and so on.  
This has included initial internal discussions around the future of the ATI, accountability for its staff, 
and media accessibility and interviews for ATI staff.  
 Individual accountability has also been given an interesting shape: as well as talking to 
journalists himself about the surveillance state and how it worked, Chakchouk began involving his 
staff, asking those who had also worked under the Ben Ali regime to speak, ‘to explain what happened 
before. So for me it's really important to involve people now.’ This was positioned as both signalling to 
staff that their help (and their own transition) is valued and recognised, and as a kind of accountability 
exercise by talking to journalists about the role they played in the regime. This approach was 
discussed with the ATI’s 70 staff members, and supported by them. However, the relationship of trust 
by ATI staff in their leadership was also very important in the public accountability process. One of the 
ATI’s staff who we interviewed anonymously highlighted this: ‘the first time I went to the media I was 
scared, I didn’t know if someone would get up and accuse me of doing something. But I had Moez’ 
support… that was important’. This issue of trust is one that many transitional justice bodies struggle 
with, and is worthy of note. 
 Chakchouk has argued that there should be more public discussion regarding the role of 
the ATI in the dictatorship’s machinery, to encourage accountability. However, at the time of our 
interview, what this might look like was still a question: 
[What we need to say now is], “this is what ATI has done. This is the equipment.” [...] And 
also I think what is important is just to have a process, to open those things, to get out 
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those archives in ATI to try to show to people a lot of details […] it's not [only] our process, 
I think the government and the state have to be involved in it, and the state has to show 
the way to the people, they have to open all those archives, and they're really huge. 
The opening of archives was positioned by Chakchouk as a part of the ATI’s debt to Tunisian society, 
but one that needed active assistance from civil society to happen. At the same time, Slim Amamou 
argued that the key issue that needs attention is the decision-making process, rather than decrypting 
the technology or opening archives. Amamou’s comment is particularly important given that questions 
still remain about information control chains of command and the relationships between the Interior 
Ministry, the police and judiciary, and the ATI. A clear aim of truth seeking and institutional reform is to 
bring to light exactly these kinds of relationships and to implement change that blocks reversion to 
such structures of control. 
 One outcome of the ATI’s ‘public legacy’ thinking is the creation of the ‘404 Lab’; the 
transformation of the former surveillance headquarters’ basement, where the regime kept its 
surveillance hardware, into a dual memorial/educative site. The 404 Lab was launched in June 2013 
as an open innovation space, designed in collaboration with civil society and hacktivists.50 
 In engaging with aspects of its legacy by championing a free Internet, creating an open 
public space on the site of former surveillance headquarters, encouraging discussions by regime staff 
with media about how the system worked, working with civil society to push for the opening of ATI 
archives, setting up global legacy projects for other less-open societies, and thinking through the 
balance of individual and collective accountability, the ATI can be said to be leading its own form of 
truth-seeking discussion about violations committed through its agency, attempting to provide 
accountability for its role in the dictatorship’s machinery, and engaging in efforts at restitution. 
Essentially, these efforts can be seen within the framework of a commitment to address its role in the 
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legacy of state-led violence and repression against Tunisian citizens.  
 This is not to say, however, that the ATI’s role has been entirely unproblematic. One 
interviewee, Phoewass, cited the ATI’s support for deep packet inspection51 (which allows packets of 
data to be filtered by their content) as very concerning. There are also questions around how much the 
ATI’s reforms have taken root: much of the trust that has been built, post-Ben Ali, in the ATI, has also 
been attributed to the work done by Moez Chakchouk. Internet activists note that this is a precarious 
situation, and Chakchouk’s recent departure from the ATI raises questions about the future of the 
institution. More broadly, there are concerns about whether attempts to resist Internet censorship and 
surveillance can be sustained without institutional support within the ATI (or other key organisations). 
This is particularly the case as deep packet inspection and other technical structures discussed by de 
la Ferrière and Vallina-Rodriguez leave the door to mass surveillance open. 
 Reflecting on the Transitional Justice Framework 
The Tunisian experiment with Internet reform alongside ongoing transitional justice 
reforms holds lessons for transitional justice theory and processes. Despite the constructive intentions 
underlying transitional justice, a number of important criticisms have been raised about its framework. 
The first of these is related to structural inequalities between transitional justice practitioners and local 
communities. In this regard, Madlingozi is among the more radical voices criticising orthodox 
transitional justice efforts,52 particularly their way of treating ‘victims and victims’ stories, as a form of 
cultural imperialism, of “stealing the pain of others”, dehumanising victims further and reinstalling First 
Worlders as morally and racially superior in relation to them’.53 Reflecting on the field’s interaction with 
the contexts in which it operates, Madlingozi has argued that ‘transitional justice scholars and 
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practitioners have not genuinely interrogated how their programmes and interventions have led to the 
disempowerment or empowerment of victims’54 or of the society more broadly. We also see some of 
these criticisms echoed in our interviews with Tunisians involved in transitional justice processes. The 
ATI’s experience allows us to examine processes related to reform and peace-building as carried out 
by local practitioners outside the formal transitional justice institutions, but nevertheless informed by 
many of the ideas underpinning the transitional justice framework. What is remarkable in this regard is 
the ATI’s horizontality, focus on collective ownership of change, and close and reciprocal relationship 
with civil society activists located beyond the small networks of peace activists usually engaged in 
peacebuilding work. 
 A second important area of learning relates to inconsistencies within the transitional 
justice framework, including the lack of internal cohesion of its goals, the extent to which its agendas 
are set by international rather than local actors, and the pursuit of core mechanisms which represent 
certain global legal principles that may impede or suffocate locally-defined efforts to come to terms 
with legacies of conflict.55 This last area is particularly contested because transitional justice, as a 
field, has been built upon the pursuit of these legal principles, which themselves come out of human 
rights frameworks.56 Critic-practitioners like Nassar57 have argued that the growing focus on 
implementing very specific mechanisms in place of thinking innovatively about addressing the 
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underpinning norm (for example on truth commissions representing the right to truth rather than on 
innovative approaches to upholding the right to truth), as well as on the prioritising of certain 
comparative experiences over others, may be undermining creative domestic approaches to dealing 
with the past. Such criticisms also point out underlying system bias: the choice of which experiences 
to include and exclude depends on whose definition is taken as legitimate by those actors 
implementing and funding transitional justice efforts. This point was raised both by ATI practitioners 
and interviewees. 
 A final relevant criticism of transitional justice’s deep institutionalisation relates to its 
consequent hesitation around comprehensively addressing issues of international complicity, including 
the complicity of both governments and private companies in human rights abuses.58 As we have 
highlighted, the Tunisian experience of transitional justice, cast against the silence around the role of 
private companies supplying the regime with surveillance technology, speaks directly to this “elephant 
in the room”.  
Robins and Gready argue that the co-option of transitional justice approaches into prescribed 
and legalistic processes has significant limitations, and prefer to refocus on a newer, broader, concept, 
termed ‘transformative justice’.59 This resonates with the Tunisian context, where much of the 
rebuilding process is taking place with reference to existing narratives and practices of transitional 
justice. The current transitional justice framework and institutions’ rigidness are highlighted by 
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transitional justice’s failure to even glancingly address Internet reform. While we do not argue that 
Internet governance should be central to transitional justice efforts, the Internet has become a key 
platform for political communication and engagement, and as such it requires some attention with the 
field, and particularly in local contexts where online censorship and surveillance were prevalent. 
 
Conclusions 
 Tunisia is the face of transitional justice in the MENA region. However, the growing critical 
literature, our summary of the current transitional justice process, and discussion of the ATI's work 
show that the course of transitional justice is not linear – especially not in a context like Tunisia, where 
the dictatorship’s end has exposed deep economic, political, and religious tensions. This paper has 
used an example of Internet governance reform in Tunisia to challenge the idea that a transitional 
justice path should consist of a set of well-formulated mechanisms representing the primary pillars of a 
transitional justice programme. Instead, it shows that there are other ways of addressing legacies of 
widespread human rights violations that are doing equally well, which combine an outlook informed by 
transitional justice discourse with local processes in order to grapple with the larger questions of 
accountability, memory, truth, and reform. 
 The ATI’s work to deal with its legacy, and indeed to shift the broader Internet reform 
process in Tunisia, holds lessons for transitional justice. It certainly speaks to three significant 
criticisms of the field: the first, and broadest, is that the transitional justice framework is inflexible and 
is not incorporating new experiences and needs. Both our interviews and the literature have shown 
that the ATI’s reforms are not on the radar of transitional justice practitioners either in-country or 
internationally, but its work began early, and has tackled all the key elements that underpin transitional 
justice concerns. It has engaged with its legacy of repression by championing a free Internet, 
establishing a kind of global restitution by setting up legacy projects for other less-open societies and 
30 
sharing its knowledge and transition with some of its neighbour states grappling with similar issues, 
creating its own version of a ‘memorial space’; a public site of learning on the grounds of the former 
surveillance headquarters, encouraging public and media discussions by regime staff about how the 
system worked, and showing evidence of attempts to balance individual and collective accountability 
while also trying to push debates on international complicity and the protection of freedom of speech 
and information. 
 It can be argued that this work is particularly important for us to learn from because, as 
our interviews have shown, there are already important voices within Tunisia signalling that some 
perspectives are being closed out or ignored by a transitional justice machine that seeks to ‘translate 
or try to translate what these people say into their own [the international community’s/practitioners’] 
legalistic language’ (Name withheld, 2013). It is telling that the ATI has managed its transformation 
while operating in a context that is clearly informed by, but not linked deeply into, the country’s 
transitional justice landscape: that is to say that perhaps being left to its own devices was a key to its 
apparent success.  
 This case study contributes in two main ways to the broader work around accusations of 
inflexibility and marginalisation of particular voices: first, it is an example of innovative thinking that 
addresses the underlying norms but that does not fit within the prescription or the areas of attention 
given to transitional justice reforms. Second, Internet reform and governance is likely to become an 
area of increasing importance for transitional justice over the coming decade; both because of the 
Internet’s growing role in citizen engagement and because it grapples with how to deal with structures 
of the legacy of surveillance and censorship.  
 The second criticism of transitional justice explored relates to the ways in which the ATI’s 
work speaks to the criticism of structural inequalities between transitional justice practitioners and 
experts and local communities, and questions around the extent to which transitional justice 
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programming truly empowers or disempowers local communities and victims. The attempts at Internet 
governance and reform undertaken by the ATI post-revolution could be considered an unorthodox 
case study, undertaken by local actors outside the formal transitional justice context but unavoidably 
infused by the broader context of seeking to engage with legacies of repression. This is perhaps an 
ideal relationship between awareness of a broader culture, goals and lexicon of dealing with the past, 
but teamed with the autonomy to create change in a way that is internally meaningful and relevant.   
 The third and final criticism we have addressed relates to its failure to more honestly 
consider international complicity in human rights abuses.  While the principle of universal jurisdiction 
has taken us some way towards global accountability, less has been done on international 
accountability for both governments and the private sector. In this respect, naming companies and 
countries which offered technology and support to Ben Ali’s surveillance architecture has opened a 
space for discussion around an issue continuously ignored; perhaps primarily because donor 
governments to transitional justice programming are often also the same states from which the 
technology comes. This issue will become increasingly relevant, as both democratic and authoritarian 
governments employ information controls with varying degrees of corporate cooperation.  
 
 
 
 
32 
 
Abrougui, Afef. ‘Tunisia: Court Quashes Verdict Ordering the Filtering of Pornography.’ Global Voices, 
February 22, 2012. http://globalvoicesonline.org/2012/02/22/tunisia-court-quashes-verdict-
ordering-the-filtering-of-pornography/. 
Anouzla, Ali. ‘Tunisia’s Transition’, Al Araby, November 6, 2014. 
Arthur, Paige. ‘How “Transitions” Reshaped Human Rights: A Conceptual History of Transitional 
justice.’ Human Rights Quarterly 31, no. 2 (2009): 321–67. 
Belhassine, Olfa. ‘Tunisia Transitional Justice Unit Focuses on Victims’, allAfrica, July 27, 2015  
http://allafrica.com/stories/201507281275.html 
Bohoslavsky, Juan Pablo. ‘Tracking Down the Missing Financial Link in Transitional justice .’ 
International Human Rights Law Review 1, no. 1 (January 1, 2012): 54–92. 
doi:10.1163/22131035-00101005. 
Breuer, Anita, and Jacob Groshek. Online Media and Offline Empowerment in Democratic Transition: 
Linking Forms of Internet Use with Political Attitudes and Behaviors in Post-Rebellion Tunisia. 
SSRN Scholarly Paper. Rochester, NY: Social Science Research Network, October 1, 2012. 
http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2180788. 
Byrne, Eileen. ‘Tunisia’s President Declares State of Emergency Following Terrorist Attack’, The 
Guardian, July 4 2015. 
Call, Charles T. ‘Is Transitional justice Really Just?’ Brown Journal of World Affairs 11 (2005 2004): 
101. 
Caryl, Christine et.al. ‘Let there be Speech: Reforming the Media in Rwanda.’ Transitions Forum 
(November 2014). 
Chesters, Graeme, and Ian Welsh. ‘Complexity and Social Movement(s).’ Theory, Culture & Society 
22, no. 5 (2005): 187–211. doi:10.1177/0263276405057047. 
Clark, Janine Natalya. ‘Transitional justice , Truth and Reconciliation: An Under-Explored 
Relationship.’ International Criminal Law Review 11 (2011): 241. 
David, Roman. ‘Transitional Injustice? Criteria for Conformity of Lustration to the Right to Political 
Expression.’ Europe-Asia Studies 56, no. 6 (2004): 789–812, 
doi:10.1080/0966813042000258042. 
de la Ferrière, Alexis Artaud, and Narseo Vallina-Rodriguez. ‘The Scissors and the Magnifying Glass: 
Internet Governance in the Transitional Tunisian Context,’ The Journal of North African Studies 
19(5) (2014): 639–55. doi:10.1080/13629387.2014.975662. 
El-Gantri, Rim. ‘Transitional Justice in Tunisia: The Implications of Political Change’, Insight on 
Conflict, 5 May 2015, http://www.insightonconflict.org/2015/05/transitional-justice-tunisia-
implications-political-change/. 
Elkin, Mike. ‘Exclusive: Tunisia Internet Chief Gives Inside Look at Cyber Uprising.’ Wired, January 28, 
2011. http://www.wired.com/2011/01/as-egypt-tightens-its-internet-grip-tunisia-seeks-to-open-
up/. 
Gall, Carlotta. ‘Torture Claims in Tunisia Await Truth Commission’, The New York Times, 19 May 
2015. 
Gallimore, Timothy. ‘The Legacy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) and Its 
Contributions to Reconciliation in Rwanda.’ New England Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 14 (2007): 239. 
Ghali, Amine. ‘The Evolution of Transitional justice in Tunisia, from the Revolution to Today,’ in Rule of 
Law and Transitional justice : Towards a Triangular Learning (European Inter-University Centre 
for Human Rights and Democratisation conference publication, 2013), 
http://www2.eiuc.org/tl_files/EIUC%20MEDIA/Publications/TJ-EIUC-GIZ-
33 
September2013_ok.pdf#page=63. 
Goldmann,  Matthias. ‘Does Peace Follow Justice or Vice Versa - Plans for Postconflict Justice in 
Burundi.’ Fletcher Forum of World Affairs 30 (2006): 137. 
Gray, David C. ‘Devilry, Complicity, and Greed: Transitional justice  and Odious Debt.’ Law and 
Contemporary Problems 70, no. 3 (July 1, 2007): 137–64. 
Guerfali, Riadh. ‘La Tunisie, 1er Pays À Constitutionnaliser La Protection de L’usage de l’Internet.’ 
Nawaat, December 25, 2013. http://nawaat.org/portail/2013/12/25/la-tunisie-1er-pays-a-
constitutionnaliser-la-protection-de-l-usage-d-internet/. 
Haugbølle, Rikke Hostrup, and Francesco Cavatorta. ‘“Vive La Grande Famille Des Médias Tunisiens” 
Media Reform, Authoritarian Resilience and Societal Responses in Tunisia.’ The Journal of 
North African Studies 17, no. 1 (2012): 97–112. doi:10.1080/13629387.2011.558308. 
HRW Demands ‘Credible’ Probe on Tunisia Detainee Death”, Al Arabiya, 19 May 2015, 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2015/05/19/HRW-demands-credible-probe-
on-Tunisia-detainee-death.html 
Human Rights Watch. ‘Tunisian Rapper Sentenced to Two Years in Prison for a Song.’ IFEX, June 17, 
2013. http://web.archive.org/web/20130414041230/http://www.tunisia-
live.net/2013/04/10/verdict-released-in-graffiti-trial. 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Tunisia: Slow Reform Pace Undermines Rights,’ February 6, 2013, 
http://www.hrw.org/news/2013/02/06/tunisia-slow-reform-pace-undermines-rights.  
ICTJ. ‘ICTJ Signs Cooperation Agreement with Tunisian Ministry of Human Rights and Transitional 
justice .’ International Center for Transitional Justice, January 17, 2013, http://ictj.org/news/ictj-
signs-cooperation-agreement-tunisian-ministry-human-rights-and-transitional-justice. 
ICTJ. ‘Tunisia’s Specialized Judicial Chambers: Q&A with Judge Walid Melki,’ 2014. 
http://www.ictj.org/news/tunisia-specialized-judicial-chambers-walid-melki. 
Institute for Integrated Transitions. Inside the Transition Bubble: International Expert Assistance in 
Tunisia. Barcelona, 2013. http://www.ifit-transitions.org/publications/inside-the-transition-
bubble-international-expert-assistance-in-tunisia/inside-the-transition-bubble-en-full. 
Joinet, Louis. Question of the Impunity of Perpetrators of Human Rights Violations (civil and Political). 
UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2, 1997. 
Kagan, Sophia. ‘The “Media Case” before the Rwanda Tribunal: The Nahimana et Al. Appeal 
Judgement.’ The Hague Justice Portal, April 24, 2008. 
http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/index.php?id=9357. 
Keskes, Hanan and Robert Joyce. ‘Tunisian Police Accused of Torture.’ Al Jazeera English, 
November 10, 2013, http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2013/11/tunisian-police-
accused-torture-2013111011124902997.html. 
Leebaw, Bronwyn Anne. Transitional justice, Conflict, and Democratic Change: International 
Interventions  and Domestic Reconciliation.  Prepared for the APSA Task Force on Difference 
and Inequality in the Developing World, April 2005. 
Leebaw, Bronwyn Anne. ‘The Irreconcilable Goals of Transitional justice .’ Human Rights Quarterly 30, 
no. 1 (2008): 95–118. 
Lutz, Meris. ‘Tunisia: Online Activists Rally to Free Fellow Blogger Fatma Riahi [Updated].’ LA Times 
Blogs - Babylon & Beyond, November 6, 2009. 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2009/11/tunisia-blogger-fatma-riahi-arrested-
held-incommunicado.html. 
Madlingozi, Tshepo. ‘On Transitional justice  Entrepreneurs and the Production of Victims.’ Journal of 
Human Rights Practice 2, no. 2 (July 1, 2010): 208–28. doi:10.1093/jhuman/huq005. 
Madrigal, Alexis C. ‘The Inside Story of How Facebook Responded to Tunisian Hacks.’ The Atlantic, 
January 24, 2011. http://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2011/01/the-inside-story-of-
34 
how-facebook-responded-to-tunisian-hacks/70044/?single_page=true. 
Martin, Emmanuel. ‘Progress Is Slow for Tunisia’s Reformers.’ World Review, May 21, 2014, 
http://www.worldreview.info/content/progress-slow-tunisias-reformers. 
McEvoy, Kieran. ‘Beyond Legalism: Towards a Thicker Understanding of Transitional justice .’ Journal 
of Law and Society 34, no. 4 (December 1, 2007): 411–40. 
Mohie, Mostafa, and Manal Hassan. ‘Get the Facts: The Case of Jailed Egyptian Activist Alaa Abd El 
Fattah.’ Global Voices Advocacy, June 13, 2014. 
http://advocacy.globalvoicesonline.org/2014/06/13/get-the-facts-the-case-of-jailed-egyptian-
activist-alaa-abd-el-fattah/. 
Musila, Godfrey M. ‘Options for Transitional Justice in Kenya: Autonomy and the Challenge of External 
Prescriptions.’ International Journal of Transitional justice  3, no. 3 (November 1, 2009): 445–
64. 
Nassar, Habib. ‘Transitional Justice in the Wake of the Arab Uprisings: Between Complexity and 
Standardisation.’ In Transitional Justice and the Arab Spring, edited by Kirsten J. Fisher and 
Robert Stewart. Routledge, 2014. 
Ni Aolain, Fionnuala and Colm Campbell. ‘The Paradox of Transition in Conflicted Democracies.’ 
Human Rights Quarterly 27, no. 1 (2005): 172–213. 
Orentlicher, Diane. Updated Set of Principles for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights 
through Action to Combat Impunity. UN Doc E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 2005. 
Pigou, Piers. ‘Special Feature: IJTJ Interviews.’ International Journal of Transitional Justice 5, no. 3 
(November 1, 2011): 504–18. doi:10.1093/ijtj/ijr024. 
Ramji-Nogales, Jaya. ‘Designing Bespoke Transitional justice : A Pluralist Process Approach.’ 
Michigan Journal of International Law 32 (2011 2010): 1. 
Razack, Sherene H. ‘Stealing the Pain of Others: Reflections on Canadian Humanitarian Responses.’ 
Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies 29, no. 4 (July 5, 2007): 375–94. 
Reuters and Bouazza Ben Bouazza. ‘Police Brutality Claims Shadow Tunisia Elections.’ News 24 
Tunisia, October 22, 2014, http://tunisia.news24.com/National-News/Police-brutality-claims-
shadow-Tunisia-elections-20141022. 
Robins, Simon and Paul Gready, “From Transitional to Transformative Justice: An Agenda for 
Research and Practice,” Transformative Justice in Egypt and Tunisia, accessed December 2, 
2014, http://www.transformativejustice.co.uk/from-transitional-to-transformative-justice-an-
agenda-for-research-and-practice/. 
Silver, Vernon. ‘Post-Revolt Tunisia Can Alter E-Mail With ‘Big Brother’ Software.’ Bloomberg, 
December 12, 2011. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-12-12/tunisia-after-revolt-can-alter-
e-mails-with-big-brother-software.html. 
Skilbeck, Rupert. ‘Building the Fourth Pillar: Defence Rights at the Special Court for Sierra Leone.’ 
Essex Human Rights Review 1, no. 1 (2004): 66–86. 
Smadhi, Asma. ‘Yassine Ayari Plans to Return to Tunisia to Challenge Prison Sentence.’ Tunisia Live, 
January 30, 2014. http://www.tunisia-live.net/2014/01/30/yassine-ayari-plans-to-return-to-
tunisia-to-challenge-prison-sentence/. 
Sriram, Chandra Lekha. Globalizing Justice for Mass Atrocities: A Revolution in Accountability. Taylor 
& Francis, 2005. 
Stover, Eric, Hanny Megally, and Hania Mufti. ‘Bremer’s “Gordian Knot”: Transitional justice  and the 
US Occupation of Iraq.’ Human Rights Quarterly 27, no. 3 (2005): 830–57. 
Szakal, Vanessa. ‘Counterterrorism Law: looking beyond laxity vs. despotism, security vs. human 
rights’, Nawaat, April 12 2015. 
Theidon, Kimberly. ‘Editorial Note.’ International Journal of Transitional justice  3, no. 3 (November 1, 
2009): 295–300. 
35 
Timmins, Jerry, et.al. ‘Thoughts on a Consultative Media Reform Process: A Discussion Paper.’ 
Institute for War and Peace Reporting (2011), unpublished. 
Tolbert, David. “‘Tunisian Spring” Continues, But Challenges Remain’, The World Post, August 8, 
2015. 
‘Tunisian Hackers Decrypt Dictator’s Old Internet Censorship Machines.’ The Observers, June 24, 
2013. http://observers.france24.com/content/20130624-tunisia-internet-censorship-hackers-
servers. 
United Nations Security Council. ‘The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-
Conflict Societies: Report  
of the Secretary-General’, United Nations Security Council Document S/2004/616 
Urech, Luca. ‘Challenging History: The Power of Transitional Justice in Tunisia’, Al Nakhlah, June 10, 
2014. 
van der Merwe, Hugo. ‘Transitions in the Middle East and North Africa: new trajectories and 
challenges for transitional justice?’. In Transitional Justice and the Arab Spring, edited by 
Kirsten J. Fisher and Robert Stewart. Routledge, 2014 
Wagner, Ben. ‘Push-Button-Autocracy in Tunisia: Analysing the Role of Internet Infrastructure, 
Institutions and International Markets in Creating a Tunisian Censorship Regime.’ 
Telecommunications Policy 36, no. 6 (July 2012): 484–92. doi:10.1016/j.telpol.2012.04.007. 
Watson-Boles, Amanda. ‘Without a Net’. Committee to Protect Journalists, 2004. 
http://cpj.org/reports/2004/10/yahyaoui.php.  
Wierzynski, Aneta. ‘Consolidating Democracy through Transitional justice : Rwanda’s Gacaca Courts.’ 
New York University Law Review 79 (2004): 1934. 
York, Jillian C. ‘Good News: Alaa Abd El Fattah Freed On Bail.’ Electronic Frontier Foundation, 
September 15, 2014. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2014/09/good-news-alaa-abd-el-fattah-
freed-bail. 
York, Jillian C. ‘The Freedom Online Coalition in Tunis: A Call To Governments To Limit Surveillance.’ 
Electronic Frontier Foundation, June 24, 2013. https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2013/06/tunis-
coalition.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
